

Liberty

NOT THE DAUGHTER BUT THE MOTHER OF ORDER. PROUDHON

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*"For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!
Shines that high light whereby the world is saved;
And though thou slay us, we will trust in thee."*
JOHN HAY.

On Picket Duty.

Mr. Lloyd's article in this issue will be dealt with hereafter. And I have not forgotten that I still owe an answer to Mr. Badcock on this question of the children.

The writer of the tribute to Mr. Lloyd's poems which appears on another page seems to me a little forgetful of the English poets of the past, in saying that their combined first books do not contain more thought than "Wind-Harp Songs." What about Shelley's "Queen Mab"? And think, too, of the thoughtful works with which he followed it when yet, one might say, a mere boy! We are reminded that Mr. Lloyd is still a young man. Well, he is not an old one, surely; but at Lloyd's age Shelley was dead. I admire Lloyd's poems enthusiastically, and have often turned back in the files of Liberty to read them again and again. But—

Judge Payne, of Cook county, Illinois, has stated before a meeting of the bar association that there is no such thing as justice in the county named. "No man who has sufficient influence to 'see' the county commissioners," he declared, "can be brought to trial for any crime on earth." He has, in response to a demand for definite charges, openly accused one commissioner of having accepted a bribe from the friends of an indicted criminal. Interesting developments are expected, as newspaper correspondents would say. Judge Payne further states that grand juries in Illinois are generally corrupt, and that they ought to be abolished. Extreme, indeed, must be the situation when judges are impelled to denounce it and to call for radical reforms, and when leading newspapers, in summarizing the evidence of wholesale corruption in all departments, intimate that the Anarchists are "almost justified" in their repudiation of government.

We have seen what Edgar Fawcett's opinions of Whitman and Ibsen are, and also how much his professed sympathy with Spencerian individualism is worth. He now adds to the stock of knowledge concerning his critical qualifications by expressing his opinion of Meredith and abusing American magazine editors for neglecting native genius and petting English authors. "Such a mass of pompous affectation," he says, "as Mr. Meredith's 'Amazing Marriage' has been chosen as a serial in 'Scribner's,' merely because certain London cliques have puffed the alleged genius of its author." Now, even Mr. Fawcett might realize that peo-

ple do not puff old writers who have a literary past extending over several decades. Log-rolling is confined to the young gentlemen whose fame rests on freshness and eccentricity, and whose output offers no promise of enduring merit. Meredith is above modern criticism; his faults are greater than the virtues of an average novelist. As one writer in the "Academy" well says, the only man who can adequately criticise Meredith is Meredith himself. There are enough ideas, wit, wisdom, philosophy, and art in one of Meredith's books to make the reputation of the ordinary writers of fiction.

The recent national manufacturers' convention in Chicago was a protectionist reunion. The nation, it is thought, is weary of Democratic tariff reform and ready to revert to "protection and reciprocity." Resolutions were accordingly passed by the manufacturers calling for a higher tariff and suppression of foreign competition. It is rather remarkable, however, that most of these clamorers for government aid are very conspicuous in the movement in favor of retiring the government from the banking business. Theoretically these two positions cannot be reconciled, but it is clear that these gentry favor private control of the currency simply because they expect to gain by the change, and not in consequence of any general political principle. They want freedom wherever they imagine that it will prove more profitable to themselves, while paternalism suits them very well indeed, provided it means money in their pockets. One of the delegates, more consistent from a theoretical point of view, drew attention to the contradiction, and offered a resolution in favor of a general divorce of the State and business, in order that the latter "may not be made to fluctuate with the breath of public opinion, but may be solidly founded on honesty, skill, industry, and natural resources." It is unnecessary to add that this resolution was tabled without any discussion. These people, however, do not really want free banking. They want private banking, "regulated" in their interest.

Protectionists have never been very respectable, but their latest antics render them unspeakably contemptible. The infant industry argument, the European pauper labor plea, the home market pretence, and all the other worn-out subterfuges have manifestly become unfit for further duty, and we are treated to long articles, under scare headlines, about a new and terrible danger, the invasion of our markets by Japanese and Chinese products. Here, about the patriotic editors, is a menace to which even

the most confirmed tariff reformers cannot remain indifferent. Prompt action must be had; let us straightway raise our tariff and protect American capital and labor from the hordes of the yellows with their low standard of living. The whole scare is based on some consular reports in which it is gravely asserted that China and Japan are about to enter upon a period of great industrial development, and that these powerful future rivals have their eyes on our markets. Everybody knows, of course, that but a short time is required to place a backward country on a level with the most advanced and active; hence it is positively criminal to allow China and Japan to overtake us and challenge our supremacy. This silly dodge may deceive the fool editors who do the bidding of their protectionist patrons, but it is doubtful whether it will make an impression on the average reader. Fortunately, the latter has not enough imagination to represent Japan and China to himself as dangerous industrial rivals of England and the United States.

At Mr. Yarros's request I state that he disclaims any intention of applying the term "irresponsible" to me in his recent reply to me on the Venezuelan question. He meant it, he declares, only for those clamorers for a vigorous foreign policy who base their demands on the Monroe doctrine. While noting his disclaimer with gratification, I remind him of his actual words: "Fortunately all responsible writers and teachers have already condemned this [Cleveland's] attempt to distort and stretch the Monroe doctrine." One naturally interprets this as meaning that all responsible writers consider Cleveland's attitude an attempt to distort and stretch the Monroe doctrine, and so condemn it. As I do not so consider it, I was justified in the clear inference that Mr. Yarros classed me among irresponsible writers. Mr. Yarros reminds me that he heard me say in private that I care nothing about consistency with the Monroe doctrine. But this remark was made by me apropos of those persons who inquire, not whether Cleveland's attitude is rational, but whether it is consistent with the Monroe doctrine,—those persons, that is to say, who accept the Monroe doctrine because it is established rather than because it rests on a rational foundation. My own view is that the Monroe doctrine is sound in its purpose and equal to the attainment thereof. And, far from believing that Cleveland has stretched it, I consider that, in stating it, he has unwittingly narrowed it, for which I condemn him. But, in declaring that it covers the present status of the Venezuela case, he neither stretches or narrows it, and for this I approve him.

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"In abolishing rent and interest, the last vestiges of old-time slavery, the Revolution abolishes at one stroke the sword of the executioner, the seal of the magistrate, the club of the policeman, the gauge of the executioner, the erasing-knife of the department clerk, all those insignia of Politics, which young Liberty grinds beneath her heel." — PROUDHON.

The appearance in the editorial column of articles over other signatures than the editor's initial indicates that the editor approves their central purpose and general tenor, though he does not hold himself responsible for every phrase or word. But the appearance in other parts of the paper of articles by the same or other writers by no means indicates that he disapproves them in any respect, such disposition of them being governed largely by mere convenience.

Russell's Individualism.

Ex-Governor Russell, of Massachusetts, is a bright young man and popular Democratic orator. He belongs to the progressive wing of the Democratic party, and plumes himself on his Jeffersonianism. He believes himself to be an individualist and an intelligent opponent of State Socialism. Recently he delivered an address to the students of the Chicago University on "Individualism in Government." He intended it to be "a plea for liberty" and a challenge to paternalism. Unfortunately the plea was weak, and the challenge rather apologetic and tame. The cause of liberty is not strengthened by such championship, and the antagonists of that cause are greatly encouraged by it. Mr. Russell's address was not only flatulent and platitudinous in its best parts, but there were admissions and confessions in it which really amounted to a complete surrender of his case. As to the deeper aspects of the problem, it is needless to say that he betrayed no consciousness of their existence.

Mr. Russell's definition of individualism is not bad, and may be reproduced:

A whole system of jurisprudence is evolved from the terse axiom handed down to us in the institutes. "Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non ledas" (So use your own as not to injure another). In all its development and varied application the common law instinctively, in administering justice, revolves around this primal principle. This principle recognizes and deals only with the individual, conferring individual freedom and individual restraint.

First, you may use your own, but, second, its use must not infringe a like right of a neighbor. The first recognizes the two fundamental rights of civilization, individual freedom and the right of property. The second imposes the necessary restriction, non-interference with your neighbor, and is really but a corollary of the first. His right is co-equal with your own.

The only criticism to be made here is that the right of property is not a distinct principle at all, but a corollary of the principle of individual freedom. There are other corollaries just as important in a theoretical sense. Mr. Russell proceeds to deduce government from his premises, as follows:

The rights and aptitude of the individual are the ne-

cessity and source of government. They also define its proper scope.

Successful government then recognizes:

1. The individual right.
2. The protection of this right.
3. In protecting it, the necessity of limiting individual action by others, and, because the power is given to others with us, to the people, of determining the limits and restraints.
4. The necessity of providing proper institutions for the education and development of the people, that they may make an intelligent and just exercise of their power.

Mr. Russell's premises warrant coercion of the aggressive, but not government or taxation of all indiscriminately. How does he deduce the right of some to form a government for the coercion of the non-invasive? It is preposterous for him to say (as he does) that he ignores the Anarchists and deals only with those who recognize the State as a permanent fact, for this begs the whole question. It is the Anarchists who fully accept his principles, and yet deny the legitimacy of his government. If he assumes government without question, regardless of his own principle, how can he ask others to respect the limits at which he arrives by applying this same neglected principle?

Having created government out of nothing, logically speaking, Mr. Russell asserts that, in addition to the protective function, it is bound to provide education in order that the people may exercise their power intelligently. No fault can be found with this. Since we do not know the source of governmental authority, we cannot confidently challenge any claim it may advance. If it is imposed from above for our good, it is not inconsistent for it to prescribe education for us for our own good. But the trouble is that the same thing would be true of any other "service" government chose to render. Whatever it might deem good for us, we should have to accept. Who can decide whether government has overstepped its proper bounds? Mr. Russell indeed lays down the rule that government can undertake only that which is essential to its safety, but how is that test to be applied? Is the government to pass upon its own conduct? If not, then who is to be the court of appeal? Not the majority, for Mr. Russell's first principles do not in any way warrant the assumption of the right to rule by the majority. Not the individual, for, if the individual can overrule the government, he can abolish it entirely.

On the consent theory, it is clear that government can undertake anything its creators are willing to entrust it with. There is no difference between education and food, or clothing, or paper money. An agent can do everything he is authorized to do by the principal. On the theory that government exists only to protect individual rights,—enforce equality of freedom,—it is clear that education is as foreign to its sphere as free soup. The notion that its "safety" depends on education is absurd. Think of an agent compelling his principal or master to receive education from him in order to know how to govern!

Of course Mr. Russell's individualism is even more lame and untenable than that of the Spencerians, for they oppose public education. But, so far as the question of the warrant for government is concerned, the same fallacy is apparent in both positions.

Mr. Russell "arraigned" State Socialism,

while admitting that there were force and significance in its criticisms upon the present society. He omitted, however, to point out what remedy his individualism provides for the evils now existing. Trusts, he thought, might properly be restrained, and he pointed with approval to such laws as those regulating interstate commerce and preventing corners and monopolies. Unfortunately these laws utterly fail of effect, and hence, from his own point of view, there is abundant justification for condemning the present system. State Socialism triumphs easily over such defences, and men like Mr. Howells, impressed by the pitiful weakness of what they fancy to be individualism, proclaim liberty to be an antique notion and empty affair. Chicago University has several demi-collectivists as professors, and they must have rejoiced in the bankruptcy of the individualist champion. Mr. Russell is bright enough to be governor of Massachusetts, but he is not fitted by nature or education to make a convincing plea for liberty. v. y.

Howells on Liberty.

William Dean Howells's collectivist proclivities are well known, and the Socialist view of liberty is equally well known. There was no particular reason, therefore, why the recent "Forum" article by Mr. Howells (on the "Nature of Liberty") should have awakened any surprise, and yet several reform papers have commented upon it as if it possessed special significance. What is still more strange is that one or two of the more individualistic of the Single Tax organs approvingly quoted Mr. Howells. Let us see what the gist of his argument is.

The antique ideal of liberty, says Mr. Howells, still holds sway in our political speculation, and it is time a rational, scientific, and practical view of it were taken. In his opening paragraph he says:

Liberty is never good in itself, and is never final; it is a means to something good, and a way to the end which its lovers are really seeking. It is provisionally a blessing, but it is purely provisional; it is self-limited, and is forever merging into some sort of subjection. It no sooner establishes itself than it begins to control itself. The dream of infinite and immutable liberty is the hallucination of the Anarchist,—that is, of the individualist gone mad. The moment liberty in this meaning was achieved, we should have the rule, not of the wisest, not of the best, not even of the most, but of the strongest, and no liberty at all.

This is so loose and vague that one who was not familiar with Mr. Howells's philosophy might put upon it a construction not necessarily inconsistent with the true conception of liberty. To say that liberty is not a good in itself, but only a means to some good, is, in one sense, true. Liberty is a means to happiness, and, if happiness were possible without it, nobody would care anything about it. If, however, Mr. Howells means that we are always necessarily conscious that, in struggling for liberty, we are trying to get a means to something else, he is clearly wrong. Means tend to become proximate ends, and in striving to obtain them we generally lose sight of the ultimate end. This is a psychological necessity, and implies no lack of rationality. It is true that we desire liberty because it is a condition of happiness, but it is also true that we are not in the habit of representing liberty to ourselves as a means. Our

love for it is instinctive, and, when we are deprived of it, suffering directly results without syllogistic reasoning.

What Mr. Howells means by infinite and immutable liberty is not clear. The Anarchistic conception of liberty involves no such qualities. It is, of course, utterly impossible to say what would follow the realization of such an unintelligible thing as infinite and immutable liberty; but it is quite possible to say what a condition of equal freedom would entail. If equal freedom were achieved, we should certainly have no stronger tendencies towards the rule of the strongest than at present. If Mr. Howells takes the contrary view, he is bound to prove that the strongest individual or group would find it easier to overcome the resistance of private defensive associations—of the entire community seeking to preserve freedom—than that of an unorganized and unintelligent mass which trusts blindly to government.

After a good deal of metaphysical talk about liberty, Mr. Howells proceeds to define the nature of liberty as he conceives it.

Liberty and poverty are incompatible; and, if the poverty is extreme, liberty is impossible to it.

How to secure every man in the means of livelihood, and so guarantee equal freedom to all, is the great problem for statesmanship to solve.

The fact remains that liberty is for those who have the means of livelihood. With them, however, it is always in danger of ceasing to be liberty and of becoming tyranny.

Opportunity is one phase of liberty, safety is another. The safe man is the only free man; and it is not enough not to be in danger, one must not be in fear of danger. When we have liberty in the form of opportunity, we must have it in the form of safety, or we have it not at all. If we wish to keep it simply as opportunity, we should lose it, for there is nothing vital, nothing lasting, in opportunity. We can enjoy liberty only in its ultimate form of safety, and we cannot, any one of us, or any part of us, be safe, unless all the rest are safe, for the insecurity of others is the perpetual menace of our own security. We must somehow be equals in opportunity.

In a word, to be free, one must be economically independent and assured of the means of livelihood. This is the Howells conception of liberty.

The conception is entirely fallacious. Mr. Howells puts the cart before the horse when he talks about securing "every man in the means of livelihood and so guarantee equal freedom to all," and he is superficial when he talks about safety in general. The only safety essential to liberty is safety from infringements on the part of others. The man who is infringed upon is not free, and the man who is perpetually threatened with infringements is also to a great extent deprived of his full freedom of action. Any other safety is no part of the proper definition of liberty. Metaphysics aside, is not the man who, under freedom, neglects to use his opportunities and, through vice of some kind, fails to preserve his economic independence, a free man? If not, who has enslaved him? The shallow would say that such a man is a slave to his own vices, but that is irrelevant to a discussion of social or political relations.

It is not true that social liberty and poverty are incompatible. What is true (and it is probably this fact that Mr. Howells has dimly perceived) is that under real liberty there would be much less poverty than now, and that the cause of much existing poverty is found in in-

fringements upon liberty. In other words, under liberty men would generally be economically independent and in "safe" possession of the means of livelihood. This safety would directly result from opportunity, and would not be something independent and additional to it. True liberty does not exist to-day, the economic sphere being less free than any other. Economic well-being, it is true, is so important that the lack of it detracts greatly from the value of such liberty as men do possess, but it is irrational to deny (as Mr. Howells tacitly does) that political and social and religious liberty has always been highly valued by mankind. History is replete with evidence to the contrary.

Poverty is a great evil, and its removal is the problem of this historical period; but it can be removed only by liberty. "We must be equals in opportunity," but not "somehow." Economic liberty alone can give us this equality. The difference between Mr. Howells's view and our view is this. He says: "Secure every man in the means of livelihood, and so guarantee equal freedom to all." How we are to secure this alleged condition of equal freedom he does not indicate, except in his concluding sentence, which is an indirect endorsement of State Socialism. We say: "Give men equal freedom, and so allow each to secure himself in the means of livelihood," equal freedom being the condition and the manner of this security. There is nothing astonishing in Mr. Howells's confusion, but that the individualistically-inclined Single Taxers should have failed to detect the fallacy of his argument is somewhat surprising.

Mr. Howells concludes as follows:

Some say that those things which are essential to liberty cannot safely be trusted in private hands; for the individual may use them not only to assure himself of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but he may use them to jeopardize another in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These philosophers have imagined that all should own the means which form the opportunity and safety of each, and so far no one else has imagined any other way out of the trouble, though few are ready to take this way.

The division of things into those essential to liberty and those not essential to liberty is, of course, a corollary from the collectivist view of capital. Mr. Howells's remark that no other way out of the trouble has been suggested is a very ignorant one. A man of his fairness ought to inform himself before making such statements. There are at least three other ways before the world to-day,—the Anarchistic way of equal freedom, the Single Tax way, and the so-called Anarchist-Communist way. To write intelligently about the connection between liberty and poverty, it is necessary to know what these different schools have to say by way of criticism as well as by way of construction.

V. Y.

The Value of Liberty.

Had Mr. Bolton Hall read "Instead of a Book" from end to end, he would not have found in it complete answers to the important questions which he puts to me in another column. Nevertheless I am disposed to pick a playful quarrel with him over his hint that, supposing it to contain such answers, he cannot afford the time needed to read such a volume in order to find them. I apprehend that no man

really hungers after any truth which he is unwilling to search for through a paltry five hundred pages, provided these pages are at all promising of results. I readily admit that the substance of "Instead of a Book" could be advantageously put into compacter form. But I have reason to believe that Mr. Hall has labored through at least two volumes that are faultier in this respect. I do not know what his religious opinions are; but I have no ground for supposing that he has so far departed from the ways of his Presbyterian father as to no longer look upon the Christian Bible as the book of books or to have failed to acquaint himself with its contents. Still less can I doubt that, as a devout Single Taxer, he has read his economic bible, "Progress and Poverty," with faithful regard to the integrity of its sacred contents. I may fairly presume him to be so familiar with the Word of God and the Word of George that he can cite chapter and verse from both with equal ease, and that, if he were asked to repeat the fifth section of the fourth chapter of the third book of the Gospel according to St. Henry, he would be no more phased than if some one were to stump him to recite the twenty-third of the Psalms of David. Yet both of these volumes are exceedingly long, one of them being several times longer than "Instead of a Book." Moreover, without underrating the ability displayed in either of them (for I consider both of them works of great power), I hold that each contains large quantities of what I regard as rubbish, and what every sane man, it would seem to me, must at least admit to be surplusage. Now, "Instead of a Book," though no man's bible,—not even its author's,—errs less than either of Mr. Hall's bibles in admission to its pages of that which is not essential, and has the further advantage of such an arrangement of contents that the less essential portions may be readily ignored. Therefore I put it to Mr. Hall that, if a reading of parts of "Instead of a Book" has inspired him with so much respect for its author's opinions as to lead him to wish to know more of them, he should not begrudge the time necessary to satisfy himself that he has exhausted it as a source of information concerning them.

If, however, the length of "Instead of a Book" is sufficient to frighten Mr. Hall, I cannot well imagine the effect of so enormous a volume as that would be which should contain an adequate answer to his first question (which he evidently expects me to answer in a column or two of Liberty's space),—viz., "what evidence is there that aggression is inexpedient?" And yet, in the paragraph containing his second question, Mr. Hall, by declaring that "the argument should be the synthetic one of tabulating facts and considering them historically," indicates that he is aware that to write a satisfactory answer to his first question would be equivalent to writing the history of human life on this planet. It is a task which I respectfully decline. I remind Mr. Hall that Mr. Herbert Spencer once set two or three able lieutenants to tabulating the history of English legislation during the last five centuries or so, and that the time and money spent in the preparation of the first few tables, covering a small portion of the fourteenth century, so frightened the millionaire who was furnishing

the means that he concluded that philanthropy's usual methods, such as the founding of libraries, hospitals, and universities, would be a less drain upon his resources than the continuation of Mr. Spencer's undertaking. Where a Spencer and a Cræsus fail, am I expected to succeed?

Still, if Mr. Hall can spare the time to examine, not Spencer's "Social Statics" merely, but that philosopher's entire works (I ought to warn him that they are longer than all his bibles together), he will find marshalled in their pages a not inconsiderable mass of facts tending specifically to show that aggression is inexpedient. And similar facts, scores and hundreds of them, have been cited, first and last, in the columns of Liberty. So that the arguments of the Anarchists are not "purely *a priori*." It is true, nevertheless, that they are largely so. But this does not discredit Anarchism. The arguments of Euclid are strictly *a priori*. Fancy Mr. Hall calling on Euclid to prove *inductively* that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles! The fact is that an *a priori* argument in which no flaw can be pointed out is presumptively sound until combatted by an *a posteriori* argument. And even then the latter is not to be accepted in preference to the former, unless the conclusion most positively appears to be a correct generalization, not only from unquestioned facts, but from the totality of such facts. Facts that are not facts, or that may not be facts, or that may appear in quite a new light if accompanied by all the other facts, are not sufficient to discredit a deduction which has withstood all the assaults of the human mind. The situation seems to be this. The Anarchists present certain *a priori* arguments. Mr. Hall has not answered them, and presumably cannot answer them, by *a priori* methods. If, now, the *a posteriori* test is to be applied, the burden falls upon Mr. Hall. It is for him, not for us, to write the universal history. Let him gather his facts, tabulate them, and pour them at us in a broadside. Then we will endeavor to estimate how much damage we have suffered, and to determine "where we are at."

To Mr. Hall's second question I answer that I know of no reason why any one should subordinate the gratification of his present desires to the good of the race. Indeed, I deny that such subordination is possible. A man's action must always be determined by his present desires and powers, and by the effect that their gratification and exercise are likely to have upon his future desires and powers. Whenever a man acts for the good of the race, he is gratifying his greatest present desires.

Coming now to the third question propounded, I answer that equanimity, honesty, and sympathy are undoubtedly among the qualities which have enabled the race to prevail, but that they do not exhaust the list. I would enumerate also the capacity to digest food, the capacity to breathe, physical strength, industry, ingenuity, invention, liberty, and many others. Which of these has been the main factor in the progress of the race I do not consider it possible to determine. In fact, the phrase seems to me rather an absurd one in this connection. Nearly all of these qualities have been *essential* to progress. Perhaps, if any one of them had been totally lacking, all the others

would have been of no avail. Now, when two things are *essential*, neither can be properly said to be more important than the other. When I ride from New York to Chicago, I am apt to think of steam as the main factor in effecting my transportation. But I see that my notion is inaccurate, as soon as I reflect that, at the present stage of invention, steam could not have carried me without a railway track, and that therefore the latter is as important as the former. So, as Mr. Hall anticipates, I am unable to affirm that liberty has been the main factor in enabling the race to prevail.

Nevertheless I think there is a marked distinction between the influence of liberty and that of all the other qualities mentioned. In fact, properly speaking, liberty is not a personal quality at all, but a condition. Honesty, courage, sympathy, ingenuity, etc., are personal qualities inhering in the individual and not derived by him from those with whom he has to deal. But liberty is a condition conferred upon or allowed to the individual by his fellows, since he, being weaker than they, cannot exact it from them. It is a quality, not of the individual himself, but of his environment. Now, since individual qualities are greatly influenced and shaped by the environment, it follows that honesty, courage, etc., will vary to a large extent as the environment varies, and that, if they are increased and developed (as I hold that they are) in an environment of liberty, then much of their direct influence upon the prevalence of the race is really an influence exercised indirectly by liberty and properly to be credited to it. It seeming to me that a condition of slavery and aggression tends strongly to confirm the oppressed in habits of cowardice, lying, and brutality, it must also seem to me that to say that courage, honesty, and sympathy have been prominent factors in enabling the race to prevail is but another way of saying that liberty has been a prominent factor therein. And, when Mr. Hall begins his writing of universal history by declaring that the Russians, Germans, Turks, and Egyptians have shown courage, independence, honesty, and sympathy in a high degree, while possessing almost no liberty at all, and at the same time have attained the very highest phases of civilization, I must impeach his reliability as a historian. I deny that these nations have attained the very highest phases of civilization, and I assert that they are conspicuous rather by lack than by possession of the qualities cited. Of the great nations long in existence I think it cannot be denied that England and France are the most highly civilized, and as certainly are they more advanced than the other great nations in the degree of individual liberty maintained. I think, too, that each combines qualities of courage, honesty, and sympathy to a greater extent than that to which they are combined by the nations enumerated by Mr. Hall. Of the four nations which he names Germany most nearly approaches England and France in point of civilization, and of these four Germany is certainly the most libertarian even now, when passing through a reactionary stage of imperial absolutism that contrasts sharply with the greater freedom which prevailed within her States before the days of Bismarckian consolidation, and which doubtless helped to lay the foundation for the power which she now pos-

sesses. Honesty is well developed among Germans, and courage moderately; in sympathy they seem to me somewhat lacking. On the whole, they have a much stronger combination of liberty, honesty, courage, and sympathy than have the Russians or the Turks, and a weaker one than have the English or the French,—a combination, in short, proportionate to their degree of civilization. As for the Russians, while we may credit them with some degree of sympathy, they are, instead of courageous and independent, hopelessly fatalistic and supine, and are so far from being honest that their own best writers pronounce them a nation of notorious liars. The Turks, on the other hand, may be allowed to be courageous, but their brutality has rendered them unspeakable, and their fame for honesty does not extend to the uttermost parts of the earth. These nations, then, by their characteristics and conditions, sustain my theory rather than Mr. Hall's. He does not see facts as they are, and his arguments well illustrate the dangers of the *a posteriori* method. (I say nothing of the Egyptians, because I know less of them than of the other nations, but I have little doubt that Mr. Hall is wrong regarding them also.)

"It seems to me," says Mr. Hall, "that, if universal experience showed that non-aggression resulted in more pleasure to the individual than aggression, men would have become non-aggressive." The fallacy here may be easily perceived by substituting for non-aggression one of Mr. Hall's own factors,—say, honesty. The sentence then will read: "If universal experience showed that honesty resulted in more pleasure to the individual than dishonesty, men would have become honest." But all men have not become honest, and yet Mr. Hall continues to believe that honesty contributes to individual welfare. Similarly, all men have not become non-aggressive, and I continue to believe that non-aggression contributes to individual welfare. There are no plainer truths than that men are very slow to learn the lessons of universal experience, and that, after learning them, they are frequently prevented by their passions from profiting by them.

Regarding the fourth question propounded, which I thus restate: Given two persons, can you prove that the equal distribution of a certain sum of happiness between them is better than so unequal a distribution of a greater sum of happiness that one of the two is less happy than in the former case? I am obliged to ask for information concerning the two persons. Are they supposed to be economically dependent upon one another in the sense that members of a highly-organized community are, and are they supposed to be sympathetic? If not, then it seems perfectly clear that an unequal distribution whether of a greater or of the same or of a less aggregate of happiness would be the better scheme for that one of the two persons whose happiness it would increase, and the worse scheme for the other one. But, if these two persons are economically dependent on each other in the social sense, then it seems perfectly clear that an equal distribution of happiness is better for both parties, since the economic conditions that tend to distribute happiness equally are identical (and this is laid down in the Gospel of St. Henry) with those that tend to increase productive power and

thereby the aggregate of happiness. Again, if these two persons, whether economically dependent or not, are sympathetic, the problem propounded becomes at once an absurd one, for its conditions imply a contradiction. The happiness of a sympathetic person cannot increase at the same time that the happiness of another person with whom the first is in sympathy decreases. In fact, it is rather absurd to talk about aggregates of happiness at all. Happiness is a matter that eludes mathematics. It cannot be reckoned by the multiplication table. I commend to Mr. Hall these lines of Shelley:

If you divide suffering or dross, you may
Diminish till it is consumed away;
If you divide pleasure and love and thought,
Each part exceeds the whole; and we know not
How much, while any yet remains unshared,
Of pleasure may be gained, of sorrow spared.

I am thoroughly at one with Mr. Hall in maintaining that not all aggressions had better be punished. Punishment is in itself an objectionable and hateful thing, productive of evil even when it prevents greater evil, and therefore it is not wise to resort to it for the redress of trivial wrongs. But, when he further declares that not all non-aggressive acts are justifiable, it seems to me that he uses words in a peculiar fashion. Justifiable means capable of being proved to be just. Now, to say of an act admittedly non-aggressive that it is unjust is to me very much like saying that black is white. I readily grant that many non-aggressive acts are mean or petty or annoying or injurious or contemptible or disgusting, but I think it hardly the best English to call them unjust or unjustifiable. Yet, if all that he means is simply what I have just granted, why does he take pains to make the statement? Does he imagine that Anarchists necessarily admire all non-aggressive acts? He thinks that a refusal to throw a life-belt to a drowning man is not an aggression, and therefore had better not be punished. The Anarchists agree with him. He thinks also that such a refusal is unkind and revolting. The Anarchists, so far as I know them, agree with him again. What is his complaint?

Mr. Hall concludes his letter in a strain surprisingly pessimistic for one who believes in the existence of a power that makes for righteousness. After declaring that it is better that society should not punish non-aggressive acts, he adds, in pretty nearly the same breath, that the very qualities which enable the race to continue will make society increasingly inclined to punish certain non-aggressive acts,—that is, do what it had better not do. Clearly, the situation is an awkward one for the power that makes for righteousness.

T.

It is with some humiliation that I note that the "Arena" is with Liberty in approving Cleveland's message. Endorsement by Flower tends to shake one's confidence. Nevertheless it is not to be disputed that the "Arena" caters to the liberal element in the community, and must be classed among progressive periodicals. Its approval of Cleveland, therefore, may properly be called to the attention of Mr. Yarros, who has declared that Liberty stands alone among progressive papers in its attitude toward England on the Venezuelan question. There are four of us now,—Liberty, the

"Open Court," "Paragraphs," and the "Arena." And very likely "there are others"; I do not find time to read all my exchanges. An additional fact to be noted is that the "Open Court" now testifies to receiving a storm of indignant letters from its subscribers (surely in the progressive camp) condemning M. D. Conway's attack on Cleveland and the United States. Will some one provide my friend Yarros with a hermitage?

Here is how the "People" meets the statement of Joseph A. Labadie that of late there has been a reaction in labor organizations against State Socialism: "Not one of the men Mr. Labadie mentions, and not one of the longer list he might have mentioned, himself included, but is, and was, and, as long as let alone, will be, a labor fakir, a fellow ignorant of the Labor Question, without trust in the capacity of the workers to emancipate themselves, egoistic, vain, corrupt, who seeks to feather his own nest at the expense of the workers, and who knows that to do that he must keep the rank and file in ignorance of Socialism." The "fellow" who writes this is, of course, a gentleman, scholar, altruist, and true leader. His words clearly imply it, and he ought to know. But the charge that Labadie, McCraith, Cohen, and others whom the fellow names are "corrupt" is a serious one, and, while everybody knows that it is a malicious and ridiculous falsehood, many will doubtless be indignant enough to demand some action on the part of the maligned. Fortunately, nothing that could be said or done would in any way increase the disgust and contempt which are generally felt for the editor of the "People." An irresponsible clown has absolute freedom of speech; to stop to contradict him is humiliating and futile, for his foul mouth can be closed by no evidence or argument of any kind.

Comrade Cohen at last has triumphed over all his difficulties, and his new edition of "Mutual Banking" is on the market. I supply it at ten cents a copy. It is a pity that, mechanically, it is not a better-made pamphlet. However, I suppose it is necessary to bow to the demands of this age of cheapness. Let us do all in our power to second Cohen in his enthusiastic effort to make Col. Greene's great work as well known as it deserves to be.

A subscriber writes me that Flower's "Anarchist," Dr. Rodolf, lives in Omaha. It was cruel of my informant to deprive me of my cherished hope that there was "no such person"—that he was simply another of Flower's

Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps.

The Secretary wants every reader of Liberty to send in his name for enrolment. Those who do so thereby pledge themselves to write, when possible, a letter every fortnight, on Anarchism or kindred subjects, to the "target" assigned in Liberty for that fortnight, and to notify the secretary promptly in case of any failure to write to a target (which it is hoped will not often occur), or in case of temporary or permanent withdrawal from the work of the Corps. All, whether members or not, are asked to lose no opportunity of informing the secretary of suitable targets. Address, STEPHEN T. BYINGTON, Flushing Institute, Flushing, N. Y.

A recent target writes me as follows in answer to my shot:

At present I will not undertake to argue the ques-

tion with you, though I do not agree with all of your arguments. I will endeavor to prepare an article on the subject of "Civil Liberty" at an early date, which will express my ideas on the subject fully. I have received a number of letters from gentlemen who believed as you do, since the editorial in question was printed. While I cannot say that I have come to agree with the principles which they have advanced, I may say that they have at least set me to thinking along lines which I had heretofore given but little thought. As to your remark that you hope I read Liberty, I have to say that I have never seen a copy of that paper, nor do I even know its address. I should, however, be very glad to see a copy, particularly the one which referred to my article.

Target, section A.—Rev. Geo. D. Herron, D. D., Grinnell, Iowa, wrote to the "Voice" as follows in reply to the question what he thought of Mr. Crosby's non-resistance argument:

I am greatly impressed with Mr. Crosby's articles on "Christ's Teachings on Social Problems." I believe in his enunciation of Christ's idea of non-resistance. Christ was not speaking piously, but was enunciating a great law or principle that inheres in the nature of things. The meek plants, the meek animals, the meek men, do inherit the earth. Paul, for instance, owns this earth to day as all the military conquerors from Cyrus to Napoleon never did. When we once understand how to apply this law, we will have a communism of a higher order than prophets ever dreamed of.

Dr. Herron is a man of wide influence, professor of applied Christianity in Iowa College (the chair was created for his special benefit by a wealthy admirer, I believe), and recognized as the foremost leader of the Christian Socialist movement west of the Alleghenies. His writings are strongly collectivist, and still more strongly altruist. He probably cannot be cured of Communism, but I don't think it hopeless to cure him of authoritarianism. Urge him to say more against the use of violence in all social relations, especially as a foundation of government. Show that, if he tries to realize his ideals of universal coöperation through a government rooted in force, this element of force will poison the whole.

Section B.—J. R. Treuthart, Portsmouth, O., writes the "South-west" a letter containing these paragraphs:

The secession movement, begun by South Carolina in 1860, and followed by two or three other States, would never have reached formidable proportions but for the fuel lent it by the Republican party doctrine of coercion. This monstrous doctrine, by which governments are to derive their powers, not from the consent of the governed, not from the excellency and desirability of their laws, but from their Ability to Coerce the Governed; this new-fangled feature of despotism; this public stand against independence, in order that the tariff-harvest of the north might prosper,—this involved us in a desperate fratricidal war. . . .

What was the Democratic position? That the constitution had not provided for such an emergency as secession. That coercion was contrary to the spirit of liberty. That the governments, both of States and nation, were too sacred to be warred against by either side. Secession, then, was a peaceable remedy. The union must be voluntary. If it were not, the national government is a despotism, under whatever false label of liberty it may attempt to sail or pose. . . .

The Republican party, bent on spoils from the beginning, holds its adherents to-day by bribery, by special monopolistic laws, franchises, positions, and blind party prejudice, ever tightening its serpent coils, ever increasing the list of the millionaires, ever multiplying the multitudes of the paupers, ever impoverishing the independence-loving middle-class. . . .

Whence then is to come our salvation? Reassert your Sovereign Rights as States! Treat as unconstitutional (as it undoubtedly is) the ten per cent. tax on State Banks. Enact safe laws for the inspection of these banks, and your financial independence is secured. Cease to be the puppets of the national administration, the football of New York syndicates, and the sycophants of European plutocrats. With safe banking facilities, their own, States can prosper, though Washington be bankrupt.

Show him the logical necessity and practical utility of demanding for individuals the same sovereign rights which he demands for States.

STEPHEN T. BYINGTON

To "Altruists."

"Spencer is cruel." Yes, as surgeon's knife, Its very edge! that cuts out death from life. Soften men's hearts, good dreamers, but take pains Not to begin by softening their brains.

James J. Dooling

Psyche.

[Translated from the German by Stephen T. Byington.]

With her little lamp in hand
And the great fire in her breast,
Psyche creeps up to the bed
Where the sleeper dear doth rest.

And she blushes and she quakes
As his beauty she espies;
Then the unveiled God of Love
Is awakened—and he flies.

Nineteen hundred years of pain!
Almost dead, poor thing, is she;
Fasts and smites herself, because
Naked Love she dared to see.

Heinrich Heine.

Happiness and Aggression.

To the Editor of Liberty:

Although, as I understand, you do not believe in a God or in anything corresponding to the idea of a God, I have much respect for your opinions, and therefore ask the following questions. It may be that the answers could be gleaned from "Instead of a Book," but that is too long for me, though I have read much of it. I suppose that you had not time to make it shorter.

(1) What evidence is there that aggression is impatient, and that the law of liberty will result in the greatest happiness?

(2) Even if it is, in the long run, inexpedient, why, if there is no power that "makes for righteousness," should any one subordinate the gratification of his present desires to the good of the race by refraining from coercing an individual? I am familiar with Spencer's argument in "Social Statics," and personally I attach much weight to it, but it appears to me that all the discussions as to whether liberty is ethically right or not are begging the question, at least from your point of view. The question seems to me to be one of evolution,—viz., how did the race come to its present stage of development, and what are the qualities that have enabled certain types to survive and to prevail? I do not think that the most ardent supporter of liberty will say that devotion to freedom has been the main factor. At least, if so, the argument here should be the synthetic one of tabulating facts and considering them historically. If universal experience showed that non-aggression resulted in more pleasure to the individual than aggression, it seems to me that men would have become non-aggressive. The complaint of the ages, from Job down, is that the wicked and violent prosper and have eyes standing out with fatness. Your arguments, I think, are purely *a priori*.

(3) Are not the qualities which have enabled the race to prevail: first, what the Romans called Equanimity,—that is, courage and personal independence; second, Honesty,—that is, reliability in their dealings; and, third, Sympathy, developed in the particular form that they are willing to help each other? It appears to me that nations like the Russians, the Germans, the Turks, the Egyptians, and others have attained, mainly by means of these, to the very highest phases of civilization, with almost no regard for personal liberty or the rights of the individual.

(4) It is by no means clear to me that aggression upon the individual and the utter sacrifice of the exercise of faculty by some individuals has not resulted, and may not still result, in the greatest Sum of Happiness, and I do not think that I could show, without calling upon a "God," that it is more important or better or more moral that two persons should have a certain amount of happiness rather than have the less developed one killed and the other have three times as much happiness. Could you?

While I think it is true that society had better not attempt to punish anything short of an aggression, it is also true that society had better not punish many things which are aggressions. It seems to me to be ridiculous to say that anything is justifiable which does not constitute an aggression.

If I see a man drowning and neglect to throw him a convenient life-belt, I have committed no aggression. Yet you know that I am a bad citizen and the public conscience will condemn me, knowing that a race of men like that could not have survived, and that, if

such traits developed, the community could never reach a high social development. Do what you will, I believe that the very qualities which make voluntary social organization possible will make any society increasingly inclined to punish men who seduce women or who buy votes, although it can be clearly shown that no "aggression" has been committed.

Yours truly,

BOLTON HALL.

NEW YORK CITY, NOVEMBER 21, 1895.

A Significant Contrast.

To the Editor of Liberty:

As an excellent example of the superiority of private over government enterprise in the matter of railways, I will instance, in supplement to the observations in my last, the astonishing celerity with which the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Company's extension to London has been carried out. In spite of the vast expense of getting the bill through parliament, the intricate settlements of compensation claims, and the powerful opposition on the part of interests affected, the whole line is now under rapid construction, less than two years after the powers were first sought. Yet the far more urgently wanted extension of the New South Wales railway system to the quay at Sidney (only two miles), though twenty years mooted, and although no parliamentary expenses are involved, and all the land required could be easily taken under power of eminent domain, has not been begun yet, and seems to be indefinitely shelved.

EVACUSTES A. PHIPSON.

Loyalty and Liberty for the Human.

It would appear that, in so far as Mr. Tucker and myself are concerned, this discussion on the child question was drawing to its natural limit. The evidence is very nearly all in, and the case about ready to go before the jury. In fact, I would be willing to say no more, were I not directly challenged in "Rights and Contract" to do so.

It is evident that in this article Mr. Tucker takes great pains to be both kind and fair, and for the spirit of it, at least, I thank him.

The "constant difficulty" of which he accuses me is not so much "an inability to distinguish between that which it is *right to do*—that is, that which it is necessary to do in order to attain the end in view—and that which one *has a right to do*—that is, that which one's fellows agree to let him do in peace"—as a sincere conviction that all the evils of society flow from making such a distinction.

Rights, I contend, should always agree with *right*, and never be confounded with *powers* or *privileges*. My right to live and be free is just the same, even though my fellows deny me the power and privilege.

Mr. Tucker says my right "can only be put into execution through contract," but I am obliged to squarely disagree here, also. If any one invades me, my right may very well be *defended* by contract, but, if men will only let me alone, I shall live and be free anyway. Nature, herself, puts my right into execution. Contract may, with perfect propriety, be the servant and soldier of right, but, when it claims to be parent and owner, the order of the universe is inverted, and "that high light whereby the world is saved" is extinguished by an act of government.

The essentially governmental character of what Mr. Tucker calls Anarchism is stated in the baldest terms when he says that: "Rights *begin* only with convention." They are not the liberties that exist through natural power, but the liberties that are *created* by mutual guarantee"—italics mine. The logic of this is that individuals who cannot understand the guarantee, who may be excluded from its benefits, or who prefer as free individuals to remain outside, have no rights whatever.

As Mr. Tucker has taken conscientious pains to explain to the reader the difference between us, I will say a few words on the same subject. The difference, I take it, is beneath the surface, and runs into the very fibre and nature of our souls.

Mr. Tucker's mind—and I mean him no injustice—is essentially formal, legal, political,—in a word, *external*. By nature he is a lawyer. My mind is intuitional, contemptuous of outward forms, moral, primitive,—*internal*,—and by nature I am a savage, or, if you will, an artist, for they are much the same. I am

a man of the wilderness, but Mr. Tucker is a man of the city. I am tremendously impressed by the Soul and the Universe, and draw all my permissions from these, but to Mr. Tucker nothing exists till the convention and fiat of man makes it. He regards me as superstitious, and I him as fatally defeated. I look to the spirit to shape the form, and he to the form to create the spirit. He is logical, wonderfully clear at short range, and a partisan. I have the overlook, and there hangs a haze, sometimes, over the far view, am eclectic, a reconciler.

The difference between us is antipodal, yet it is wonderful on how many points our extremes meet.

And I thank him for the admission that the phrase "might is might" is more accurate than "might is right."

He demands, in italics, that I shall prove "that it is right, best, necessary, to guarantee equal liberty to all human beings." (I am a little suspicious of that word "guarantee" as here used. There might be a taint of contract creation about it. But, if the guarantee is to admit and defend the right of equal liberty, I agree. Do not make a *privilege* out of a *right*, but defend the right which exists. Old-fashioned Anarchism used to lay great stress upon "mind your own business," but the new doctrine proposes to "create" and "give" rights; and even this is not sincere, for the man who "gives" me a right may withdraw his guarantee whenever his might pleases and leave me without it.)

It sounds to me like a strange challenge to come from the mouth of an Anarchist. And it is elsewhere repeated in another form.

In the first place, I must admit that it is difficult to demonstrate the advantages of an ideal state of society which nowhere exists to-day, except in the relations, here and there, of very small groups of individuals.

But, on the other hand, Mr. Tucker must admit, too, that, in a society fully committed to the principle that the life and liberty of all should be held inviolate, he and I would be perfectly safe and as happy as our natures would permit. That is common sense, and there is no "lingo of religion" about it. And it is equally common sense to say that we would be less safe, just in proportion as our fellows disregarded or denied this principle. If contract takes the place of principle, we are safe only within the terms of the contract, and according to the pleasure of those who have the power to make and enforce it. Under Mr. Tucker's contract the moment he or I became, by age, disease, or accident, unable to understand it, we would be outlawed and legitimate objects of exploitation.

But who shall assure us of Mr. Tucker's contract? Mr. Badcock would have quite another one, in which sympathy, taste, likes and dislikes, would meddle and invade. And still another and even more probable one has been suggested in these columns,—a contract between those of equal powers to make property of those who are weaker. Why not?

The spirit of contract is the same as the spirit of the political and legal institutions of to-day, which are all really founded on the tacit agreement among the strong that human might creates human right. Among all civilized peoples we find the fiction that rights begin and are created by law, contract, and legislative force; and this is government, and from this society is sick and rotten, and against this there is always the rebellion of the moral and instinctive nature, the appeal to rights primitive and inherent; and for this rebellion and this appeal I stand.

The average savage sees this, at least in regard to his own clan, much more clearly than the civilized; he is nearer to nature, his sense of justice is keener, his rights and happiness more secure, than ours. Civilization, having started west to go east, will finally include the universe and return to the starting-point, and we shall all be one tribe of enlightened nature-men as free as Eskimos.

"Life," says Emerson, "invests itself with inevitable conditions, which the unwise seek to dodge, which one and another brags that he does not know, brags that they do not touch him; but the brag is on his lips, the conditions are in his soul."

"It is thus written because it is thus in life. Our action is overmastered and characterized above our will by the law of nature. We aim at a petty end, quite aside from the public good, but our act arranges itself by irresistible magnetism in a line with the poles."

of the world. . . . Treat men as pawns and ninepins, and you shall suffer as well as they. If you leave out their heart, you shall lose your own. . . . All infractions of love and equity in our social relations are speedily punished. They are punished by Fear. Whilst I stand in simple relations to my fellow-man, I have no displeasure in meeting him. We meet as water meets water, or as two currents of air mix, with perfect diffusion and interpenetration of nature. But, as soon as there is any departure from simplicity and attempt at halfness, or good for me that is not good for him, my neighbor feels the wrong; he shrinks from me as I have shrunk from him; his eyes no longer seek mine; there is war between us; there is hate in him and fear in me."

My position that man should maintain the equal liberty of man as against all other animals, that it is human equal liberty that we want and that an inoffensive man should be sacred to his fellow, excites Mr. Tucker. He denies that this is what we want, and asserts that my remarks are "superstitious," "absurd," "sheer nonsense," "lingo of religion," etc. Perhaps, but to my own mind they are a reasonable conclusion drawn from much observation of nature.

I observe that individuals of a species are naturally inclined to coöperate against individuals of other species and for mutual defence and benefit. In proportion as they become more gregarious does this tendency increase, and as the coöperation increases is the security, power, and happiness of the species and of its individuals increased.

It appears to be a rule of nature to which there are few exceptions that each species is latently or actively at war with all other species. And a recognition of equal liberty among individuals of a species brings coöperation up to its highest spontaneous limit.

If all this is true,—and I think every naturalist will endorse it,—my distinction between man and the other animals is not "arbitrary," but reasonable and natural, and there is "more reason" for a human being's "saying that man should not be property because he is human than there would be in saying that dogs should not be property because they are canine." The natural order is coöperation and comradeship to all within the species, and battle to all without, and we disregard this to our loss.

I shall not refer to the arguments made by Mr. Tucker on minor points, for I do not see that they either strengthen his position or weaken mine. Leave those to the jury.

I have a hope of a free society in which no man shall claim, or dream of having admitted, any right to injure or own another of the human race.

And, until that comes, there is neither safety or happiness or fullness of life. J. WM. LLOYD.

How the Devil Became Bald.

[Catalpe Mendès in Le Journal.]

Everybody knows that the Devil is bald; and, logically, he had to be. For the worst of uglinesses (*eh! eh! je suis orfèvre* *) could not be spared the abominable author of every human ill.

But it is less generally known how Lucifer, whom some call Iblis and others Beelzebub, lost his hair.

I shall tell the story as it was told to me by a barber of Pampelune, over whose door was the sign, "The Wig of Satan."

Blond as the morning star, red as the flames of hell, black as eternal night, the rebellious angel's hair was so prodigiously bushy and bristly that it outspread over the earth and the sea like a huge umbel of tufts and locks. And Our Lord was much chagrined thereat. For, even by putting on his spectacles, which are made, as everybody knows, of the last star of the South and the last star of Septentrion joined by a comet's tail, he could not distinguish, through the scrubby immensity of this dark and flaming mass of hair, the beautiful world that he had created. Now, when one has invented roses, the least that he can ask is the pleasure of looking at them. Furthermore, the Lord, according to the most authentic portraits that we have of him, has more beard than hair; and he felt,

perhaps, a little jealous.

Of course, nothing would have been easier for him than to shivel the Devil's hair with a flash of lightning. But he had already cracked his forehead by this means, and, as a demiurge who felt the scruples of an honest dramaturge, he was loath to employ it a second time. So that he would have remained for a long time in perplexity, had not the Holy Ghost, always a good counsellor, spoken as follows:

"Cousin, it is a mere trifle that embarrasses you. Simply decide that, for every murder that shall be committed on earth, Lucifer shall lose a hair; judging from the way in which human beings slaughter one another, his head will soon be as smooth as a rock on the beach, worn by the tides of twenty centuries."

"What!" sighed the Good God, "those whom I made are, then, so fond of unmaking each other? Very well, we will try this plan."

Then, having said: "Let Lucifer lose a hair for every murder that shall be committed on earth," he relapsed into silence, waiting among the splendors, the azures, and the harmonies of his eternity.

And Crime depilated the Devil! Not a thrust of a dagger or sword or lance or knife, not a blow of a hammer, not a gunshot, that did not pull from his head a dark or flaming hair; and on days of battle he lost handfuls. Yet, so marvellously numerous were the Devil's hairs that, after some time had passed (it was an April day), the Lord, leaning over, could not see through them, even dimly, the lilac branches in which the tomtits build their nests and sing their songs of love.

But the Holy Ghost:

"Do not despair. By some strange anomaly they are not killing each other as rapidly as usual on earth. Simply decide that, for every robbery that shall be committed on earth, Lucifer shall lose a hair; since, if things are viewed in their true light, men possess only what they steal from each other, his head will soon be as bare as a little angel's posterior."

"Cousin!" sighed the Good God, "I can hardly believe that mortals are all thieves. What have they to take, since I gave them the beauty of the sky and of women, flowers, birds, and the waves of the sea, and the depths of the green forests where one may take his siesta in the shade! However, I will try this new plan."

And he said: "Let Lucifer lose a hair for every robbery that shall be committed on earth." And, while waiting, he enjoyed the concerts of the seraphim.

The infernal skull was treated rudely. Whether a boy stole a marble, or a highwayman robbed a traveler, or Alexander the Great conquered the Indies, or Cæsar captured Gaul, or a harlot emptied the pockets of a sleeping *bourgeois*, or a pickpocket relieved a countryman of his watch, each act of theft tore from it a hair, a hair, a hair, and again a hair. There were transactions on the stock exchanges that cost him enormous locks. But the miraculous head of hair showed only a few furrows here or there, like the paths of an immense forest; and our Lord was still unable to see his beloved earth. Above all it would have pleased him to follow, through his starry spectacles, the walks of loving couples between the hawthorns, which he had perfumed for their benefit, toward the moss to which he had given softness expressly for their sakes.

The Holy Ghost, anxious:

"Then they steal so little? Let us take an heroic measure. Ordain, Cousin, that, for every stupidity that shall be uttered on earth, Lucifer shall lose one of his hairs."

"Ah, there! Ah, there! Cousin," said the Good God, "you are growing disrespectful. Do you think that those whom I made in my image and whose souls were born out of my breath are downright imbeciles? Nevertheless, I will make the trial. Let Lucifer lose one of his hairs for every stupidity that shall be uttered on earth."

Oh! the poor head of Beelzebub! It was denuded like a field of wheat in a tempest. Puns, music-hall songs, observations before the pictures in the art-galleries, fell furiously upon it. First nights of vaudeville, lectures by M. Brunetière, beat upon the Devil's neck and temples, stripping them entirely. But the invincible mass of hair persisted, in spite of all the efforts of human stupidity. As ever, it outspread, like

a huge umbel of tufts and locks, hiding even the paths between the flowering hawthorns where loving couples walk.

Furious, the Holy Ghost shouted:

"Now for the last resort of all! Ordain, Cousin, that, for every adulterous kiss that shall be given on earth, Lucifer shall lose a hair."

The Good God got very angry.

"Ah! truly, Holy Ghost, you go too far. What! have you so bad an opinion of the young women that I have taken every care to make so pretty and so honest? The wives of earth, happy to be the grace and charm of the fireside, and to talk, in the evening, with their husbands and children, around the family lamp, take good care to avoid forbidden paths. Certainly, they are amorous; it was my intention that they should be; but their virtuous tenderesses do not gainsay their tender virtues."

"Try it, at any rate," said the Holy Ghost.

"Well, just to show you your ignorance, I will," said the Lord.

And:

"Let Lucifer lose a hair for every adulterous kiss that . . ."

He did not need to finish the sentence. The Devil was bald!

"Wind-Harp Songs."

To the Editor of Liberty:

I would like space for a few words about Lloyd's poems. Geo. E. Macdonald, although very pleasant, appreciative, and witty, appreciates not altogether in the right place, and, under the circumstances, is almost too humorous. He says that Lloyd feels rather than sees. Let me quote something which Lloyd saw:

The East is pale as pearl; faint stripes of red,
Athwart, burn clear and fine, the fields are white
And drawn with drifts curl-lipped like shells: the
Night

Hath banished Storm; the Winds, wide-winged, are
fled,

And with the sun, lo! all the world hath gems
And fire of stabbing sparks and jewels a-cling
To crystal twigs and spangled sprays and stems—
While tinkling on the crust the falling ice-casts ring.

It is a rare description of a rare sight. Nothing finer in English poetry than the two lines before the last.

"Mr. Lloyd is not a poet of thought," says George. Well, my opinion is that, should you take the first volumes of all the English lyric poets and run them through a winnowing machine, you would not collect more sound grains of thought from the lot than there is in this one little first book of Lloyd's.

I do not blame Macdonald, however, when

A feeling of disgust upon his senses there did fall
As he looked upon the Muses, chopped particularly small.

It perhaps may not be well to cut poetry into small chunks, like suet for puddings, and to run the risk of having a page in the body of the work mistaken for the index; but there is something in the value of artistic suggestion. For instance:

On the banks of a placid stream, wherein is reflected the beauty of its surroundings, lie a lovely Greek youth and maiden, wrapped in not much of anything except each other's arms and sleep. All the phenomena of summer are about them,—birds, bees, and a picnic basket. Bright, fleecy clouds in the heavens, and in the distance the blue mountains.

Why, it would not take an artist,—even a decorative painter could make a picture from the hints furnished by Mr. Lloyd.

I cannot say that the book is without blemish. It seems, in places, to be a little too quaint; I at first did not get the hang of it, but it grows on one. I will not say that it is "a worthy contribution to the poetry of the age." What is our poetry? and by whom written? Not a volume in which some oppressor of man is not praised. Even Emerson the Great mingles his bright grains of thought with fool-fodder. Longfellow at his books, Tennyson titled and pensioned. Lowell writes "Sir Launfal," is appointed hog reeve, and goes to hobnob with the queen. Byron, noblest of them all, lo! lying like a pet spaniel in the arms of some fair woman.

But here is a man who has lived most of his life with his hat on, giving homage to no man of blood and thunder, communing deeply with the Mother of us all and keenly alive to her moods and her manners.

* Literally, "I am a goldsmith," but symbolically, "I am an interested party," the latter meaning growing out of the use which Molière put the phrase in one of his plays. In the present instance Mendès is *orfèvre*, because he has an abundant head of hair.
—EDITOR LIBERTY.

He is comparatively a young man and may do greater things. Is not this a "plant" to be cultivated?

The professional critics may decide that "Wind-Harp Songs" is not "a worthy contribution to the poetry of the age." They may say that or what they please. But I will say to them and to the world: it is a "topaz hearted ambe-drink," fit not alone for "the immortal gods," but for mortal man with all his fleeting joys and tender sorrows. X. Y. Z.

Solutions.

How'll you explain the tightened times,
O fine old民主-Bat?
We'll lay it to the capitalists
And let it go at that.

How will you solve the problem,
Sly puss, republic-Bat?
We'll lay it all to Grover,
And let it go at that.

And what remark have you to make,
Soul-stirring popu-Flat?
We'll lay it all to the street named Wall,
And let it go at that.

One more I chanced to interview—
The blind religio-Bat.
He laid it to the Devil,
And I let it go at that.

William Walstein Gordak.

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